The origins of social justice

Taparelli drew on St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in understanding justice as a virtue. A virtue is a settled tendency to desire and do the good. The virtue of justice, according to Aquinas, is “a constant and perpetual will to render to each his due.” Social justice, for Taparelli, is a form of the virtue of justice, specifically, the will to give others their due simply because of their common membership in society.

Virtues belong to individuals, but social justice can also refer to an ordering of society. In such a social order, persons are treated as virtuous persons would treat them, and they are shaped to treat others the same way.

What is “due” to our fellow members of society? For Taparelli, it is the ability to exercise their rights and fulfill their duties. Humans have rights to pursue the good, which in this life is the full development of their natures, and duties corresponding to those rights. Human goods are of three principal kinds, matching three levels of human nature: material, social or moral, and intellectual. We thus have rights to essential material goods, such as food and shelter, and duties to pursue them. Similarly for intellectual goods, we have a right, for instance, to know the truth and a duty to seek it.

As to social goods, it is part of our nature to belong to society. When Taparelli speaks of social justice, he sees it as an orientation to the good of the whole society, which his tradition labeled the “common good.” This includes the good of individual members, but also the good of a well-functioning whole. We might think of a good jazz band concert, which requires more than virtuoso performances by the individual musicians.

A central component of social justice is “distributive justice,” fairness in the distribution of those things to which individuals have rights. Social justice, according to Taparelli, requires that the members of society have equal access to essential material, social, and intellectual goods. Later thinkers labeled another component “contributive justice.” Contributive justice requires that individuals contribute to the well-being of the community, insofar as they are able, and that society make it possible for them to do so. If part of the population can have little or no impact on how society functions, contributive justice is violated.

In many ways Taparelli’s thought belongs to the 19th century. But we can still learn from him today. It’s common now to view the task of social justice as, to quote a textbook, “to dismantle … oppressive institutions and policies.” This is surely part of social justice, but taken alone it emphasizes destruction and opposition. Taparelli reminds us, however, that social justice is a virtue that wills the common good of the whole society. It calls upon us to work toward a society in which material, moral, and intellectual well-being is accessible to all.